How is that risk free? If the clinic goes bankrupt the VC will be on the hook for the rest of the loan. It’s not free money.

"lends" -> "borrows", right?

First, VC stands for venture capital, which is a subset of private equity that does zero LBOs and doesn't even acquire any businesses. VC funds buy equity in startups, and take on zero debt to do so. You have your boogiemen totally confused.

Second, the entire point of a PE fund that uses a leveraged buyout strategy is that they need to sell the acquired firm at a profit to make any returns to the fund. LBO funds don't 'cashflow' businesses, and saddling a business with a bunch of debt is antithetical to that purpose anyways.

Third, this is not "risk free revenue." It's a high risk strategy to use the debt to increase the value of the business by improving operations enough that you can sell it for a profit to the fund. If you saddle a company with debt and DON'T increase the value of the business beyond the debt you took on, the PE fund will not be in business for fund 2.

The risk-free revenue while the fund is alive comes from the management fees that investors in the fund pay (usually 2%, which is way too high IMO, but has nothing to do with the debt or the acquired businesses).

Please do not write confident sounding comments about things you don't understand, it spread misinformation and makes the internet a worse place.

Think pre-IPO buy-in. Investors in the know and other well connected institutional investors get first dibs on all of the good ones. The bad ones are pawned off to retail investors. It's no different with private credit and private equity. These sorts of deals have good ones and bad ones - the good ones will have been taken by the time it flows down to retail.

So unlike money-market funds, these private-credit funds can gate withdrawals and extend and pretend by turning cash coupons into PIKs. So I don't actually see credit concerns directly driving liquidity issues for the banks that didn't hold the risk on their balance sheet glares Germanically.

Instead, I think the contagion risk is psychological. Which is an unsatisfying answer. But if there are massive losses on e.g. DBIP and DB USA halts withdrawals, then the 2% stock loss Morgan Stanley suffered when it capped withdrawals [1] could become a bigger issue.

[1] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/stock-market-today-dow-sp-5...

For example, take First Brands, a multi-billion-dollar company which filed for bankruptcy last year. First Brands had pledged the same assets as collateral for loans from multiple private-credit funds. Those loans were being carried at a fantasy NAV of 100 cents per dollar, until suddenly they were not. Did none of these lenders submit UCC filings so other lenders could check which assets had already been pledged as collateral? Did none of these lenders ever check to see which assets had already been pledged? Did all these lenders make loans based on blind trust?

Failing to check and verify that assets have not been pledged as collateral to other lenders is an amateur mistake. It's reckless, really. The equivalent in home-mortgage lending would for a mortgage lender never even bothering to check that a homeowner isn't getting multiple first-lien mortgages simultaneously on the same home, then forgetting to put the first lien on the property title.

My take is that for many private credit funds, NAVs are basically fantasy.

Apparently they operate on very low level of tolerable risk (way lower than I thought)

Recruitment tables should just have a banner that reads 'we've already spent your bonus on legal fees, here's some chocolate'

If the bank has trouble, shareholders/executives lose - if the banking system has trouble... then QE will solve the bank trouble.

Been a bit out of the finance game

So, it's sort of like bundled mortgage securities, where you take some bad loans and mix them together to get a "less risky" loan, since the chance of them all defaulting at once is less than the chance of all but one defaulting.

Presumably, since banks (by definition, an intermediary) are involved, those are then recursively repackaged until they have an A+ rating, or some such nonsense, right? Also, I'm guessing there's no rule that says you can't intermingle these things across separate "independent" securities, even if the two securities end up containing fractions of the same underlying bad loans?

Clearly, like with housing, there's no chance of correlated defaults in a bucket of bad business loans that's structured this way!

In case you didn't quite catch the sarcasm, replace "housing loans" with "unregulated securities" and note that my description switches from describing the 2008 financial crisis to describing the Great Depression, or replace it with "bucket shops" (which would sell you buckets of intermingled stocks) and it would describe every US financial crisis of the 1800s.

How is this inconsistent with what I said? I was just making the point that the reason for the rise of private credit is that banks are less willing / able to lend, particularly to riskier borrowers, as a result of post-2008 banking regulations. So private lenders have stepped in to fill that gap.

It is. (EDIT: It's a mixed bag. OP was correctly calling out a definitional error.)

Banks have loaned $300bn mostly to private-credit firms. Those firms then compete with the banks to do non-bank lending. It's a weird rabbit hole and I'm grumpy after a cancelled flight, but it feels like I'm in the middle of a Matt Levine writeup.

It depends when you measure, but you can Google around and find figures in the 60-80% range. 80% may have been a bit on the optimistic end of the range. But it's important to note that a "default" doesn't imply a 0.

Of course this will depend on the covenants, underwriting standards, type of collateral.

I would guess software equity collateral recovery rates are lower than hard assets like a building. (Which is why I personally don't like Software loans, nothing to do with AI)

> Correct. The question is if 20% is enough, and if a 20% markdown creates a vicious cycle as funding for e.g. re- or follow-on financing dries up.

I think it's almost certain that new fundraising for private credit will be materially hindered going forward. But this just limits the growth rate of these firms, does not introduce any "collapse" risk.

They may move from net inflows to net outflows and bleed AUM over a period of some years.

If NAVs were inflated previously, they may be forced to mark down the NAV to meet redemptions rather than using inflows to payoff older investors.

In the world of credit, 20% is an enormous haircut. Again, senior secured loans fell by around 30% peak to trough in 2008.

We have the public BDC market as a comparison point where the average price/book is around 0.80x. So the public market is willing to buy credit strategies at a 20% discount to stated NAV.

The real systemic risk here, if we were to reach for one, is really that these fears become self fulfilling.

If investors pull funds out of credit strategies en-masse, there is no first order systemic issue, but it means borrowers of many outstanding loans may not be able to secure refinancing as money is drying up.

This could lead to a self-fulfilling default cycle. But this would be a fear driven default cycle, there is no fundamental issue with cash flows of borrowers or otherwise (in aggregate, currently).

Finally, in regards to the asset managers themselves, many are quite diversified.

Yes, they have private credit funds, but many have real estate funds, buyout funds etc. OWL is one of the biggest managers of data center funds, for example (which they also got hammered for on AI bubble fears)

Given how depressed pricing is in public REITs, for example, I expect a lot of asset managers to pivot towards more real asset funds.